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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE STATE OF UTAH

MARCELL PITCHER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Civil No. 10563

C. W. LAURITZEN,
Def-endant and Appellant
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff brought action against Defendant to recover
the reasonable value of hay and straw taken from his
farm in the Summer and Fall of 1962, and for conversion
of the hay. Defendant counterclaimed, alleging a valid
earnest money receipt for the sale of the farm, claiming
the hay and straw taken, and requested specific performance of the contract, and or damages for breach of the
contract.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Trial Court submitted the question of reasonable
value of the hay and straw to the jury and adopted the
jury's findings as to value. The additional question of
repudiation was submitted to the jury, and remaining is-1-

sues tried to the the Court. The Court found in favor of
the Plaintiff and against the Defendant and awarded judgment for reasonable value of the hay and denied specific
performance of the earnest money receipt as requested in
Defendant's counterclaim.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent does not agree with the Statement of Facts
as outlined by Appellant, and restates the facts to give
a more complete picture of the case now before the Court.
On October '14, 1961 Ravsten Healty obtained a 6
months farm listing from Plaintiff (Def. Exh. 7). The
h~ting called for a cash sale of his farm at the price of
$126,000.00. Towards Spring of 1962, Ben Ravsten, real
estate man, contacted Plaintiff and stated Defendant was
interested in the farm and had reduced the price of 30
acres of land in North Logan and that he, the real estate
agent, had a prospective purchaser for the property, and
that if Plaintiff would sign the Earnest Money receipt he
could move the property by May 1, 1962 (See Dep. 27
and Tr. 140-141).
Plaintiff signed and delivered the Earnest Money
receipt on the express condition that he was not interested
~n the North Logan property, which he had never seen,
and that the final contract would not be agreed upon, prepared or closed until the sale of the North Logan property,
at which time this sale could go through. (Tr. 140-141,
151 and Dep. 27).
The Plaintiff and Defendant had never met together
prior to or at the time of signing the Earnest Money
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Receipt. Signatures of each of the parties was obtained
separately by the real estate agent Ravsten. (Tr. 49-50,
122). The contract expressly provided:
"The total purchase price of $100,000.00 shall be
payable as follows: $100.00 which represents the
aforesaid deposit, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by you. $ ________________ on delivery of deed
OR FINAL CONTRACT OF SALE WHICH SHALL
BE ON OR BEFORE MAY 1, 1962. Balance of the
purchase price to be paid as follows: 30 acres in
North Logan as indicated by map, valued at $50,000.00 $25,000.00 cash from loan on SELLERS
FARM; Seller to carry the balance on contract or
second mortgage at 5% interest." (Def. Exh. 1).
The real estate man did not make a sale of the North
Logan property by May 'l, 1962, or at any other time. No
final contracts were ever discussed, drafted, presented or
signed. (Tr. 87). Loan application was made by the
real estate agent but no loan for more than $12,600.00
could be obtained on Seller's farm (Tr. 124, 126).
The real estate agent called on the parties at different
limes and got them together about twice at his office in
an attempt to reach a meeting of the minds on a possible
deal for the above and other and different property
(Tr. 28).
Sometime in the Summer of 1962, the real estate
agent called Mrs. Pitcher and stated the Defendant was
in need of hay and would it be agreeable for him to get
Plaintiff's hay. Mrs. Pitcher told him that they (the Plaintiffs) had no animals to feed and that she would
consult her husband about Defendant's request. Later
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she told the real estate agent the hay was for sale and
that the Defendant could remove it from the Plaintiff's
farm (Tr. 149). The real estate agent relayed this information to the Defendant but the said real estate agent
could not remember any details about the hay (Tr. 178179). This matter was never discussed between the
parties themselves (Tr. 29). There is no issue raised on
this appeal as to the Defendant taking the hay and straw
or its value of $3,487.00, the amount fixed by the jury and
in the judgment ( R. 2).
Each of the parties remained in possession of their
respective lands and subsequent negotiations between the
Plaintiff and Defendant were directed towards an en·
larged deal (Tr. 89, 133, 191).
On June 16, 1963, the Defendant and his son came
to the home of the Plaintiff to go over the farm. The
Plaintiff had gone to church and the Defendant and his
son looked over some property not mentioned in the
Earnest Money Receipt. They then came back to the
house and Mrs. Pitcher testified as follows:

"A. I was going to get Marcell (Plaintiff) for
them and they said 'No, they would go to the farm
and look it over and they would be back.' I told
them when they came back, I would go get him. Mr.
Lauritzen came back. It was a quarter to twelve
when he came. I told him I'd get Marcell and he
said, 'no, just tell him the deal is off.' He left." (Tr.
63-64).
Thereafter, the parties met only a couple of times
(Tr. 28). During these meetings the Plaintiff a ttemped
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to collect his money for the hay and straw. (Tr. 32). It
wasn't until Plaintiff brought this action in an attempt to
collect the bill for the hay and straw, that he learned of
the claim of the Defendant, that the Earnest Money
receipt was still valid. It wasn't until the trial that
the Defendant tendered a deed and offered to pay $25,000.00, the amount of the loan (Tr. 159-160). During this
lime (approximately 2 years) the Plaintiff had made valuable improvements on his farm in excess of $20,000.00
(Tr. 189).
\Vhile the evidence is somewhat conflicting in many
respects the Court made the following Findings: ( R. 37).
3. That neither the Plaintiff or Defendant had
met the other at the time the Earnest Money Contract was signed, but signatures were obtained by
one B. J. Ravsten, real estate broker, who represented
to the Plaintiff that the price of the North Logan property had been reduced and that had a prospective
purchaser for the same. The said B. J. Ravsten stated
that he expected to close the sale of the North Logan
property within ten days. The Plaintiff relied upon
these statements and signed the Earnest Money Contract, believing no final contract would be entered
into to close the transaction until the North Logan
property had been sold.
4. That at the time Plaintiff signed the Earnest
Money Agreement no map was exhibited to him and
he had never seen the premises. The Plaintiff stated
to the real estate man that he was not interested in
the North Logan property unless the same could be
sold for cash, which he needed to get into the sprinkler pipe business. That the 30 acres mentioned in
the Earnest Money Agreement to be traded by De-
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fondant to Plaintiff for $50,000.00 was a part of the
189 acre tract owned by Defendant and a description
of this 30 acres was not obtained until a survey was
made in October, 1962 and the same was never accepted by the Plaintiff.
5. That no final cantract was ever prepared,
made or presented to the Plaintiff within the time specified therein or within a reasonable time thereafter,
by the real estate agent or either of the parties. That
no conveyance of any property was ever prepared
or ever presented to either party for signalure until
at the trial in 1965, when the Defendant prepared
and tendered a deed to the North Logan property
( 30 acres). That an attempt was made to obtain a
loan of $25,000.00 but no loan for such sum could br
obtained or any sum in excess of $12,600.00. That
by reason thereof it was impossible to perform this
condition of said contract and Plaintiff is excused of
any performance under the terms of the Earnest
Money agreement.
6. That the said Earnest Money contract made
no mention as to the time for possession for the Pitcher form or the North Logan property. That each
of the respective parties remained in possession of
their respective properties. That at no time prior to
the removal of the hay and straw by Defendant did
either party request of the other the right to posses·
sion of the property agreed to be sold or exchanged.
That both prior to and after the removal of the hay
and straw, there were some negotiations in the office
of the real estate broker to assemble a contract agreeable to the parties, but at no time were the terms of
such contract agreed upon. That the taking of the
hay was not taking possession of the property under
the Earnest Monev contract and Defendant was not
entitled to ownership of the hay or other crops before
-6-

obtaining possession of the real property or until the
purchase price therefor was paid.
7. That during the latter part of July or the
first part of August, 1962, the real estate agent called
Plaintiff's wife on the phone and stated that the
Defendant was in need of hay and asked if Plaintiff had hay to sell. Thereafter, the real estate agent
reported to the Defendant that Plaintiff had hay
available and he could get the same. That between
August 15, 1962 and November 15, 1962, the Defendant or his agents removed at least 165 ton of
hay and 44 ton of straw from Plaintiff's farm. That
no conversation was had between the parties concerning the removal of hay until August, 1963, when
Plaintiff attempted to collect the amount due from
the Defendant from the hay and straw, at which time
the Defendant conditionally offered to pay $2,000.00
for the same. That at the time the hay and straw
were removed by the Defendant from Plaintiff's farm,
it was baled and stacked, except the Third Crop hay
and straw, which were baled but still in the field.
That Plaintiff believed he was selling the hay to
Defendant and Defendant believed he was entitled
to the hay under the Earnest Money Contract.
8. That there was no meeting of the minds of
the parties with regard to the sale of the hay, and
the Court further finds that at that time the Earnest
Money Contract had not been performed according
to his terms. The Defendant used the straw and fed
the hay to his cattle. That Defendant has not paid
any sum to the Plaintiff for the hay or straw and the
Court accepts the jury findings on special verdict of
the hay as being in the sum of $3135.00 and the value
of the straw being in the sum of $352.00, making a
total of $3487.00 for both. The Court finds said
amounts are a fair and reasonable value for the hay
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and straw removed by the Defendant from Plaintiff's
farm. That by reason thereof, the Defendant is indebted to the Plaintiff for the sum of $3487.00, plus
interest thereon at 6% per annum from November 1.5,
1962 to date hereof in the sum of ~656.25.
9. The Court further finds that the Plaintiff
retained possession of his farm property for the years
1962, 1963, 1964 and 1965. That he paid for and
harvested all crops thereon during these years, and
made valuable improvements on the said farm during this time in the sum of $20,000.00. That it would
be inequitable and unjust to attempt to grant specific
performance of the original Earnest Money Agreement, which would unjustly enrich the Defendant
after this long and unreasonable length of time, even
though the Court finds such agreement was a valid
contract in its inception, but further finds that the
said agreement was subsequently abandoned by the
parties, and that negotiation thereafter were directed
to an effort of making a new contract, which was
never agreed upon.
POINTS OF APPEAL
1. Where the Defendant obtained hay from Plaintiff without any meeting of the minds as to the terms of
the purchase of the hay and without consideration, the
Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for the fair market value
of the hay.
2. The Earnest Money receipt in this case is not
specifically enforceable because it is indefinite and mtcertain as to many necessary details essential to the contract.
3. That the conduct of each of the parties and failme to finalize a contract within the time specified in the
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Earnest Money Receipt or a reasonable time thereafter,
was sufficient evidence of abandonment of the Earnest
Money Contract, if the same was a valid contract.
4. It was impossible to finalize the Earnest Money
receipt according to its terms.
5. That because of changed conditions within more
than three years between the signing of the Earnest
Money receipt and the trial of the case, it would be grossly
unjust to grant specific performance of the contract at
this time.
ARGUMENT
1. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO THE REASONABLE VALUE OF THE HAY AND STRAW TAKEN BY
DEFENDANT FROM HIS FARM IN THE SUMMER
AND FALL OF 1962 WITHOUT CONSIDERATION.
The Defendant apparently does not contend that
the value of the hay and straw is unreasonable. The law
seems well settled in this point that plaintiff is entitled
to reasonable value of the hay or quantum Meruit.
To begin with, it should be stated that the rule in law
cases in this State has been well established over a long
period of time as follows:
"The Trial Court's finding in a law action must be
sustained on appeal if supported by any substantial
competent evidence." Vadner v. Rozzelle 88 Utah
162, 45 P. 2nd, 561.
"In law cases, the Supreme Court is bound by
Findings of Fact of the Trial Court if supported by
-9-

any competent evidence." Harper v. Tri-State Motors, Ins. 90 Utah 212, 58 P. 2nd 18.

"In law cases, trial court's findings are not disturbed unless so clearly against weight of evidence
as to indicate misconception or lack of due consideration thereof. Greco v. Gentile 88 Utah 255, 53
P. 2nd 1155.
"In law cases, the findings of the trial court are
approved, if there is sufficient competent evidence to
support them, and are disturbed, unless it is manifest that they are so clearly against the weight of
evidence as to indicate a misconception, or not a due
consideration of it." Jensen v Howell 75 Utah 64
282 Pac. 1034.
While no Utah case on the question of growing crops
has been mound, a recent well considered Idaho case,
Nuquist v. Bauscher 227 P. 2nd 83, 85, does seem to be
in point: The Idaho Court says:
"The general rule is, subject to exceptions not
herein necessary to discuss, that if there is no agreement, expressed or implied, in a contract for the sale
of real estate, the purchaser is not entitled to possession until the full payment of the purchase price has
been made, and if the purchaser complies and receives the deed to the premises, he is then, and not
until then, entitled to possession of the property sold."
"The rule is stated in 55 Am. Jur. 808, Par. 385,
2s follows:"H 0 that if there is no agreement, express
or implied, in a contract for the sale of real estate,
that the vendor shall deliver possession of the premises before the foll payment of the purchase price,
the purchaser is not entitled to the possession: and
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that a mere contract for the sale of real estate which
provides that if the purchaser complies with his part
of the contract and pays the purchase price as agreed,
the vendor will then deed the property, raises no
legal inference that possession of the property is to
be given before the deed is to be executed."
"The rule covering growing crops on premises
is stated in 15 Am. Jr. 202, Par. 11 as follows: "If, 0000
the purchaser is given no right to the possession until
until the time for conveyance arrives, he acquires no
interest in the growing crops which mature and are
harvested before the time for the conveyance and his
right to possession arrives."
"A discussion of cases on the subject would serve
no useful purpose and would unnecessarily extend this
opinion to an unreasonable length. For a review of
the subject matter and cases thereon, see: Barrell v.
Britton, 244 Mass. 273, 138 N.E. 579, 28 A.L.R. 1069."
Wilson v. Sanchez 254 P. 2nd 594 in a California case
supporting the same rule of right to possession.
In the interest of brevity we refer to the Note in 28
A.L.R. 1069, where many cases are listed, for the rule in

the Idaho case.
Rules on Appeal in equity cases are as follows:
"Supreme Court has full power to review all questions
of law and fact in equity case and to set aside trial
Court's judgment if, in opinion of Supreme Court,
such judgment is not supported by evidence, but,
where case was regularly tried and trial court found
on all material issues, its findings will not be disturbed by Supreme Court unless they are so manifestly erroneous as to demonstrate oversight or mistake which materially affect substantial rights of
-11-

appellant." McKay vs. Farr, 15 U. 261 49 P. 649;
Klopenstine vs. Hays, 20 U. 45 57 P. 712; Elliot v.
Whitmore, 23 U. 342, 65 P. 70.
See also:
Omega Inv. Co. v. Woolley, 72, U. 474, 271 P. 797
Escamilla v. Pingree, 44 U. 421, 141 P. 103. Sidney
Stevens Implement Co. vs. South Ogden Land,
Building & Improvement Co. 20 U. 267, 58 P. 843.
Silver King Consol. Mining Co. v. Sutton 85 U. 294,
39 P. 2d 682.
39 P. 2d 682. Clotworthy v. Clyde, 1 Utah 2nd 251;
265 Pac. 2nd 420.
There are no special circumstances in the case at bar
that would indicate the Defendant was to take possession
of the property before the final contract was agreed upon
and executed. All the evidence in this case why the
Plaintiff should not be entitled to a judgment for the
value of the hay and straw as entered by the Court.
2. THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT IN THIS
CASE IS NOT SPECIFICALLY ENFORCEABLE BE·
CAUSE IT IS INDEFINITE AND UNCERTAIN AS TO
MANY NECESSARY DETAILS ESSENTIAL TO A
CONTRACT.
Counsel for appellant cites authorities holding that
an Earnest Money contract can be specifically enforcenble. These authorities have no fact situations similiar to
this case. There is no evidence that plaintiff changed his
mind as contended by defendant. Plaintiff has always
maintained that the contract was signed on the condition
-12-

of the sale of the North Logan property, and the conduct
of the parties and the real estate agent indicates that the
parties understood this.
In the case of Bowman et al vs. Reyburn et al, Colorado 170 P2d, 271 at page 275 the Court says:
"The contract must be enforced according to its
terms or not at all. A COURT IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO COMPEL A PARTY TO DO SOMETHING HE DID NOT CONTRACT TO DO. In
the case of Schmidt v. Barr, 165 NE 131, 135, 65 ALR
1. This Court said in Hunt vs. Rousmaniere's Adm'rs
1 Pet 1, 14, 7 L. Ed. 27 Equity may compel parties
to perform their agreements, when fairly entered into,
according to their terms; but it has no power to make
agreements for parties, and then compel them to
execute the same. The former is a legitimate branch
of its jurisdiction, and in its exercise, is highly beneficial to society. The latter is without its authority,
and the exercise of it would be not only a usurpation
of power, but would be highly mischievous in its
consequences."
In the case of Adams v. Renders 168 US 573, 18 S.
Ct. 179, 182, 42 L. Ed 584, the Court states:
"In an action for specific performance, the Contract must be free from ambiguity and it must be
clearly established that the demanded performance
is in accordance with the actual agreement of the
parties. Offutt v. Offutt, Md, 67 A. 138. "A greater
amount or degree of certainty is required in the
terms of an agreement, which is to be specifically
executed in equity, than is necessary in a contract
which is to be the basis of an action at law for
damages. "
-13-

Before a contract can be specifically enforced the
contract must be complete, definite and certain.
In 65 ALR 102 it states:
".... On the other hand, a suit in equity is wholly
an affirmative proceeding, its objective being to procure a performance by the Defendant specifically,
and this requires a clear and precise understanding
of the terms of the contract, for they must be CLEAR
AND DEFINITE before the performance thereof can
be decreed."
In the Oregon case of Smith vs. Vehrs 242 P2d 586,
page 589, it states as follows:
"In Berry v. Wortham supra, 96 Va. at page 89,
30 S.E. at page 444, the Court said: "It is an elementary doctrine of Courts of equity that they will not
specifically enforce any contract unless it be complete and certain ... .It must be complete in all its pmts;
that is, all the terms which the parties have adopted
as portions of their contract, must be finally and
definitely settled, and none must be le~ to be determined by future negotiations; and this is true without any regard to the comparative importance or unimportance of these several terms."

The above case also holds that the Court cannot make
clear that which is left in doubt and uncertain. For this
reason it would have been error for the Trial Court, in
our opinion, to attempt to make a contract for these parties
with regard to the Earnest Money Receipt now before the
Court. The Defendant failed to prove what property was
intended to be conveyed by the parties as listed upon the
said Earnest Money Receipt. The attention of the
of the Court is called to the testimony of Marcell Pitcher
-14-

THEREAFTER, WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF
ABANDONMENT OF THE EARNEST MONEY CONTRACT EVEN IF THE SAME WAS A VALID CONTRACT IN ITS INCEPTION.
The facts show that following the execution of the
contract on or between April 16 and 20, '1962, that no
final contract was ever prepared or offered to Plaintiff
for signature.
The record indicates that various attempts were made
over a period of many months to put a deal together, but
the terms were never agreed upon or completed.
The conduct of the parties clearly indicates that they
never considered the Earnest Money Receipt a binding
contract or anything other than a preliminary attempt to
see if a deal could be put together.
Defendant never called upon Plaintiff to request
possession of the farm. He retained possession and control of his North Logan property and Plaintiff kept possession of his farm in Cornish and Weston.
After the Earnest Money Receipt was signed Defendant did not undertake to farm the property of the Plaintiff, or show any interest in crops such as grain, beets
and hay which were planted and harvested. The Defendant did not attend to the plowing, planting of
crops, protecting the property, or do anything of any
kind to produce or harvest any crops. He did not irrigate
the hay, cut, rake, bale or stack the hay. Certainly this
conduct is inconsistent to that of a person who claims
to have purchased property or was bound by a contract
to purchase it.
-19-

The foregoing is ample to negotiate the argument of
counsel that Lauritzen did everything he could to get the
contract completed. The fact is he did absolutely nothing
at all until after the hay was stacked or the third crop
baled in the field. Plaintiff had the hay for sale. Ravsten,
the real estate agent, arranged for Lauritzen to go get it.
(Tr. 149). The parties were still negotiating and Ravsten
was still trying to find a buyer for the North Logan property. Pitcher made no objection to Lauritzen taking the
hay, assuming he would pay for it.
The admitted actions or conduct of the Defendant all
indicate an abandonment. On June 16, 1963, the Defendant expressly manifested this intent when he told Mrs.
Pitcher the following:
"Just tell him the deal is off."

(Tr. 64).

This manifestation of his intent, together with his
prior conduct supports a finding of abandonment by the
Court. The Plaintiff's conduct in keeping possession of
the property, farming it and cropping it as he did for the
years 1962, 1963, 1964 and 1965 clearly establishes his
intention that he never considered the contract as valid
or binding. The fact that he made improvements upon
the farm during this time, in excess of $20,000.00 is entirely
inconsistent with Defendant's argument that he did not
have the necessary intent to abandon.
Since the Court found the contract was valid in its
inception, the only reasonable conclusion the Court could
reach from the conduct of the parties was the time for
performance fixed in the agreement had long passed, that
-20-

they subsequently abandoned the deal. This finding
would not have been necessary if the Court had correctly
found this ECl.rnest Money contract was not valid and
binding as contended by the Plaintiff in his Cross Appeal.
4. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN THE LOAN
AND FINALIZE THE EARNEST MONEY CONTRACT
ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS:
In this case, the efforts to obtain a loan were made
by the Plaintiff through Mr. Ravsten, the real estate agent.
Mr. Ravsten, however, was not able to get a loan for
more than $12,600.00 on Sellers (Plaintiffs) property.
(Tr. 124, 126).

The record shows there was some mention of a
$25,000 loan committment being made by Cy Clark upon
the North Logan property (Tr. 124-125). When Mr.
Ravsten attempted to get this loan the money was no
longer available (Tr. 128, 129). Remember that North
Logan property was not Sellers property as specified in
the Earnest Money receipt; upon which a loan was to be
obtained.
As to the impossibility argument, Counsel for appellant, seems to indicate that it was plaintiff's responsibility to obtain the loan. The fact that there were pre
existing mortgages on his farm is immaterial. There ic;
no evidence in the record indicating that these mortgages
were the reason that the loans could not be obtained.
Counsel is merely speculating and attempting to blame
plaintiff (because a loan could not be obtained). One
might ask what did defendant do towards obtaining the
loan. All the efforts of Mr. Ravsten were directed to-21-

wards getting the parties together and finalizing some of
the points which were left open at the time of the original
negotiations of the contract. ( Dep. 7 and 8).
"Impossibility of performance of contract is defense to action for specific performance thereof,
though impossibility is Defendant's fault, as equity
will not order defendant to do something beyond his
power." Rachou v. McQuitty et al, Mont. 1951,
229 P2d 965, 968, citing Rest: of law of contracts Sec.
368, p. 669. Also 5 Williston, Contracts, Rev. Ed.
Sec. 1422. p. 3973.
In the case of Crittenden v. Hansen et al, Cal. 1943,
138 P2d 37 pages 38 and 39 the Court stated as follows:
"But since the contract has become unenforceable, appellant is confronted with the settled rule that
specific performance will not be required when its
enforcement would be impossible or inequitable."
The facts of this case clearly fall within this announced rule of law.
5. IT WOULD BE INEQUITABLE AND UNJUST
FOR THE COURT TO GRANT SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THIS CONTRACT THREE YEARS OR
MORE AFTER IT WAS EXECUTED.
In this case, the Trial Court, sitting as a Court of
equity, had the duty to look carefully at all the evidence
and determine whether equity and justice could be obtained by granting specific performance.
More than three years and five months elapsed be-

t ween the time of the execution of the Earnest Money
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receipt and the trial where the Defendant requested the
Court to grant specific performance. This was only after
the Plaintiff brought a lawsuit for the purpose of recovering money for the value of hay and straw removed by the
Defendant from his farm in the Summer and Fall of 1962.
During the intervening time, Plaintiff made considerable
improvements in the farm. (Tr. 140, 89). To force the
Plaintiff to now sell under the original terms would cause
irrepairable damage to the Plaintiff.
As to Counsel for Appellant's third point, that the
plaintiff could not recover the improvments made on the
[arm in 3}~ years, he cites the case of Erisman v. Overman
11 Utah 2d 268, 358 P. 2d 85. This case is not similar to
our case in any facts whatsoever. In that case the defendant had entered into possession, failed to make
monthly payments as required in the escrow contract for
a period of 10 month, apparently claiming the right to
offset the payments for a sewer hookup. During the time
they made improvements on the home, and then after
::i.ction was brought against them for delinquencies under
the contract they tried to recind the contract and collect
for improvements. In our case, possession was never surrendered. Each party farmed their own lands. Plaintiff
never considered his farm as sold, and defendant never
made claim to it until after action was brought by plaintiff
for the price of the hay in the summer of 1963.
In 61 ALR page 58 it states:
"In the exercise of its discretionary powers to
determine when the equitable relief of specific performance may be invoked, on the general rules formulated and followed is that this equitable relief will
not be granted if, under the circumstances, either
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because of the inequitable enforcement of the contract would be harsh, inequitable, oppressive or
unconscionable. . "
The Defendant, after this long delay should be
estopped from asking for specific performance, after knowing that the deal never did go through and the final contract was never made by May 1, 1962 as contemplated
by the parties, and from asking this Court for Specific
Performance, when this action was brought for the purpose of recovering money for the purchase price of hay
and straw, which the Defendant admits he received and
never paid for.
Near the end of the trial the Court was exploring
the question of whether the offer was fair and just and
might result in an agreeable compromise settlement of
the case. The following record is recited.
"The Court: I have got to ask you again, Mr.
Pitcher. Now here is a deed to the North Logan
property. Mr. Lauritzen is ready to give you $25,000.00 in cash and then sign a note and a mortgage
on your property up there for $25,000.00. Now
what's wrong with that?"
A. "This here price of this property in North
Logan for $50,000 is so unrealistic, your honor, that
it isn't worth a tenth of that."

A. "The reason we signed this thing was, Mr.
Ravsten made the statement that he could sell the
property, and it was on that premise that we signed
it. (Tr. 162).
Finally, the Court of equity here considering all the
facts and circumstances of the case can only do justice
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between these parites by leaving them as the owners of
their respective properties. The Defendant is out nothing
whatever. He got the Plaintiff's hay and fed it to his
cattle and should pay for it.

If specific performance were granted here on the
vague and insufficient terms of the Earnest Money receipt or the offer above referred to, thus forcing the
Plaintiff to take the two tracts, 20 acres of which is still
s:1ge brush land comprising approximately 30 acres with
no rental value shown and for which no sale can be found,
it would result in the Plaintiff suffering a loss of approximately one half of the list price of his property, when the
loss of the improvements placed on the property by Plaintiff is considered.
There was no meeting of the minds of the parties on
any such a deal and the Court should not make it for
them.
CROSS APPEAL
RESPONDENT CROSS APPEALS FROM THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE EARNEST
.MONEY RECEIPT WAS A VALID CONTRACT IN ITS
INCEPTION.
RESPONDENT'S POINTS ON CROSS APPEAL
Respondent cross appeals from the Trial Court's ruling that the Earnest Money Receipt was a valid contract
and relies on the following points:
1.

That the Earnest Money receipt (Def. Ex. 1) did
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not contain a sufficient description of the land to be sold
or received to contribute an enforceable contract."
2. That there was no map prepared of the North
Logan property until the late Fall of 1962. The map
finally offered in evidence as a survey was prepared by
Defendant without consulting the Plaintiff or giving him
an opportunity to accept or agree to it. It was totally
unacceptable to the Plaintiff.
3. That the contract is indefinite and slient as to
who was to make the $25,000 loan or its terms and condi·
tions or who was to pay the same or necessary terms to
constitute a contract for sale or exchange of real eseate.
4. Contract fails to set forth whose obligation it was
to pay the existing FHA mortgage on Plaintiff's property
in the sum of $23,000.00.
5. The said Earnest Money Agreement was expressly signed upon the representation and belief that
the real estate agent had or would have a sale for the 30
acres before the terms of a final contract would be agreed
upon before May 1, 1962. That this was a mere preliminary step towards a later final agreement.
6. That there was never a meeting of the minds of
the parties as to any of items 1 to 6, but they did, by
words and conduct, establish that the said Earnest Money
contract was merely a temporary receipt to be finally
determined if the transaction could be finalized by agreement.
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ARGUMENT
In the interest of brevity the previous arguments in
support of the above points are not repeated here but
should apply also on the Cross Appeal.
The description of the property to be conveyed by
Plaintiff is as follows:
220 acre Pitcher farm, 60 acres Bambrough farm
and 160 acre Weston Farm.
Together with all water rights and owners interest in well, pump and sprinkler pipe at Cornish,
Cache County, Utah.
To be received by Plaintiff, "30 acres in North
Logan as indicated by map."
These descriptions come squarely within the rule
in the case of Adams vs. Manning 46 Utah 82 148 Pac.
46,) where this Court, in a well considered opinion, said
rnch a description could not be construed to meet the
statute of frauds. In that case, as here, there were
other lands owned by the vendor and it was not pos~ible to identify from the document which land was
intended to be transferred. The Court says if that is
sufficient, what becomes of the statute of frauds. There
was claimed possession in that case and yet the Court
reversed the Trial Court, saying that the possession shown
was not sufficient part performance. There is nothing
that even squints of part performance here.
No surveyor or anyone else could take these descriptions and locate any land. The Court found there was no
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map shown to the Plaintiff and the record amply establishes this finding (Tr. 131, 146). Defendant Exhibit 3
from which it appears the description in the deed tendered
at the trial was prepared in the Fall of 1962 and platted in
December 1962. It was prepared by the Defendant without consulting Plaintiff or giving him an opportunity to
accept it. The record is not clear when, if at all, this was
shown to Plaintiff but it is clear that the Plaiintiff never
accepted it or agreed to it.
The Survey allots Parcel "A" 21.6 acres in the Southeast corner of the 189 acre tract and Parcel "B" near the
Northwest corner of the larger tract. The two tracts, according to the scale of the map are about 3600 feet (almost
.7 mile) apart. The survey did not purport to survey the
fence lines that could mark the boundaries or property in
mind. If the Defendant could pick out two tracts of sage
or uncultivated land for the 30 acres, what is to prevent
him from picking out a dozen other pieces. Certainly,
there was no evidence that the Plaintiff knew there were
to be two pieces (he had not seen the land when he signed
the agreement (Tr. 131) and he was never willing to
agree to these descriptions.
In the depositions of Mr. Ravsten, the real estate
.igent, he stated that at the time of the execution of the
contract by the parties, he did not have any maps which
which he referred to that would have described the pro71erty used in the Earnest Money receipt. (See Dep.
page 21 lines 21 to 28).

We believe Counsel for Defendant must admit that
part of the Plaintiff's home farm was not intended to be
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included in the sale as evidenced by Mr. Ravsten's testimony, (Dep. page 3, line 27), wherein he states that the
home place was not to be included in the deal. It should
be noted further that the Plaintiff has additional land in
~md around the said area, and no indication is given where
the dividing lines would be between the lands purportedly
intended to be .sold herein and the lands that he intended
to keep.
This leaves the record devoid of any evidence of the
meeting of the minds of the parties as to the descriptions
of the property.
In the case of Durham vs. Dodd, 79 Ariz. 168, 285
P 2nd 747, 749, the Court, construing the interpretation
of contract therein, cites the Re-statment of Law on Contract, Section 207, which prescribes a test to determine
the adequacy of a memorandum to make enforcible contract under this statute of frauds. This section provides:
"A memorandum, in order to make enforcible
a contract within the Statute, may be any document
in writing, formal or informal, signed by the party to
be charged or by his agent actually or apparently
authorized thereunto which states with reasonable
certainty, ... (b) the land, goods, or other subject matter to which the contract relates, and ( c) the terms
and conditions of all the promises constituting the
contract and by whom and to whom the promises are
made."
This case further states that the boundaries must
be ascertainable from the memorandum and that this
cannot be supplied by parole. It cites 139 ALR, 965 an
annotation.
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A Washington case of 1960, Bigalow vs. Mood, 353
P. 2d 429, 430 states:
"We have held consistently that in order to
comply with the statute of frauds, a contract for
deed for the conveyance of land must contain a description of land sufficiently definite to locate it
without recourse to oral testimony, or else it must
contain a reference to another instrument, which does
contain a sufficient description (citing numerous
cases ) ."
The rule established by the above authorities clearly
establish that there must be a meeting of the minds as to
the identity of the property being sold or traded. The
description could not be selected and prepared by the
Seller without some agreement by the Buyer. If the Trial
Courts ruling in this case is affirmed, let us have a ruling
that the Adams v. Manning case, Supra, is overruled and
that real estate agents are encouraged in their preparation
of these form Earnest Money receipts to just insert a
number of acres and then select any piece of property out
of a larger piece that suits their convenience to hold the
purchaser, so that they can collect their commission.
Surely this Court is not going to go that far.
The real estate agent, Ravsten, testified in his deposition, which was published (Tr. 173), that there was no
meeting of the minds as to many of the terms of the contract as indicated by the following testimony:

Q: "And did you discuss with Mr. and Mrs. Pitcher
or either of them the matter of the balance of
the $25,000 on the transaction, whether it would
be by contract or second mortgage?"
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A:

"That it would be contract, and as I recall, although the details had not been worked out,
I'm not certain whether it was a ten or a fi~een
year period."

Q:

"It was one or the other, but you've forgotten."

A:

"That's correct."

Q:

"And were those details worked out at or about
the time this draft of April 16, 1962, was made?"

A:

"They were discussed but were left open. When
this was prepared pending some decisions on the
part of Mr. Pitcher, as I recall the details." (Dep.
7 & 8).

In addition to the failure to have a proper description
that would satisfy the Statute of Frauds the Earnest Money
receipt and offer to purchase is defective in that it provides that part of the purchase price was to be a $25,000
cash loan on Seller's farm and that there is no statement
in the contract indicating what type of loan this was, what
interest rate would be paid, when it would be payable,
what annual payments were to be made and who was to
make the payments, what land was to be mortgaged, who
would obtain the Loan and who would pay it.
It is obvious from the long effort and negotiations
that took place over the Spring, Summer and Fall of 1962,
::rnd Spring and Summer of 1963, that no loan was ever
obtained on the said property, thus complying with this
provision of the Earnest Money contract. It would appear, that this fact alone, would be sufficient grounds to
hold that the Earnest Money contract was fatally defective.
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A further reason why the contract is defective is that
it provides that the balance of the purchase price would
be carried on a contract or second mortgage at 5% interest.
Here again, there are no terms spelled out concerning the
method of payment, who was to make the payment,
whether or not it was to be made on an annual, monthly
or other basis or whether it was to be on a contract or a
second mortgage. Thus, we have in this particular Earnest
Money receipt, areas which make the contract fatally defective as a sufficient memorandum to comply with the ,
Statute of Frauds as required by statute.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff is entitled to an affirmance of the fudgment for the reasonable value of the hay. Even if the
Earnest Money receipt was a valid contract in its inception, it was an executory contract only, and never was
executed to the point that would pass any title to the
crops.
The Court erred in holding the Earnest Money re·
ceipt was a valid contract in its inception. If this point
is now sustained, as we contend it should be, the other
discussions about specific performance will need no further consideration.
The Earnest Money receipt was so indefinite, un·
certain, and left so many items "Open" that it cannot be
found to be so definite, clear and complete as to justify
a judgment of specific performance.
The Court should not undertake to make some con·
tract for these parties that they were not willing to make
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for themselves. This is not a case where the Plaintiff
changed his mind. His conduct and actions were all con~istent with his testimony as to the conditions upon which
he signed the paper.
To grant specific performance here would do unconsionable injustice to the Plaintiff. To deny specific perlormance injures no one unless consideration is given to
the right of the real estate agent to collect his commission.
Any one of the four matters mentioned in in the last
four paragraphs is sufficient to sustain the trial judgment
nf the Trial Court.

If there are technical errors in some of the rulings of
~he Court, growing out of some confusion in the record,
all such errors were harmless and should be passed by in
the interest of ending these three years of litigation.
Respectfully submitted,
HARRIS & HARRIS
Attorneys for Respondent
31 Federal Avenue
Logan, Utah
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